Abstract
Introduction
With the rapid-increasing population of the Internet, people tend to communicate with each other through the common but insecure channel. Hence, how to prove the source and confirm the integrity of the transmitted message is an important issue. Because digital signature can provide integrity, nonrepudiation, authentication of data, it is often employed and plays an important role in electronic commerce. To adapt to the demand of a limited bandwidth and low storage, K.Nyberg and Rueppel [1] first proposed a signature scheme with message recovery based on the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem. In their scheme, the original message does not need to be sent, and any verifier can recover the message from the signature, which is useful for many applications in which small messages should be signed. For example, small messages including time, date and identifier are signed in certified email services and time stamping services. Subsequently, Horster et .al [4] proposed an authentication encryption scheme that is modification of Nyberg-Rueppel's scheme. As an important security technique, authenticated encryption can ensure that the message was sent to a specified recipient securely via the insecure network environment.
To efficiently generate authenticated ciphertext blocks containing a large message, Zheng [11] proposed another a cryptographic technique called signcryption. It employs both asymmetric and symmetric encryptions in the encryption part of the signature. However, Petersen and Michels [12] indicated that the method of gaining non-repudiation violates the confidentiality of Zheng's scheme. And signcryption algorithm can been produced by combining a signature and an encryption.
However, in an authentication encryption scheme, the signer may generate the signature for a message and send it to a specified receiver, and only the specified receiver can recover and verify the message. Therefore, an authentication encryption scheme can be regarded as the combination of a data encryption scheme and a digital signature scheme. In other words, it realizes authentication and encryption in a logic step without symmetric encryption.
In 1999, Araki et al. [13] proposed a convertible limited verifier scheme to enable the recipient to convert the message and verify the signature. However, this scheme might be unworkable if the signer is unwilling to cooperate. In 2002, Wu et al. [14] found this weakness and then proposed a convertible authenticated encryption scheme. Unfortunately, in 2003, Huang and Chang [7] found that Wu et al.'s scheme has a weakness. This weakness is that if an adversary knows the message, then he can easily convert a signature into an ordinary one. To overcome this weakness, they also proposed a new convertible authenticated encryption scheme. But G.L.Wang et.al [8] showed that Huang-Chang's scheme was also insecure. Later, Chien [10] also proposed a new convertible authenticated encryption scheme. Unfortunately, in 2005, Zhang and Wang [20] found that Chen's scheme have not unforgeability and non-repudiation. Then, they also proposed an improvement of Chen's scheme.
These convertible authenticated encryption schemes have a weakness. Their schemes can not work, when the signers are more than one. According to practical business requirements, a document sometimes needs to be signed by more than one manager in an enterprise or organization, at the same time, to improve the above scheme's weakness, in 2008, Wu et al. [9] propose a convertible multiauthenticated encryption scheme based on the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. The proposed scheme is used to deliver a message which is chosen and signed by multi-signer. The generated authenticated message of the proposed scheme is independent of the number of total participating signers, so it is very suitable for multi-signers. Even though Wu et.al claimed that their scheme was secure. Wu et. al's scheme is shown be not secure in [16] . To improve the computational efficiency and remove the message redundancy, in 2009,Tsai et al. proposes a new convertible multiauthenticated encryption scheme [10] based on the intractability of one-way hash functions and discrete logarithms. In this paper, by analyzing Tsai et al.' scheme, we show that Tsai et al's scheme is insecure, it exists against rogue key attacks, which allows the adversary chooses his public key as a function of public keys of honest user, making him to produce forgeries easily. To overcome such attack, we give an improved multi-authenticated encryption scheme by including two hash functions. The main idea of improved scheme comes from a multisignature scheme in the plain public key model. Because the public key of every user mustn't be verified in the plain public key model, and can be against dishonest user's rogue key attack. And our improved scheme is the same efficiency as Tsai et.al 's convertible multi-authenticated encryption scheme with one-way hash function [10] .
In the rest of the paper, in section 2, we review Tsai et.al's convertible multi-authenticated encryption scheme; in section 3, Tsai et.al convertible multi-authenticated encryption scheme is analyzed ; an improved scheme is proposed in section 4; finally, we draw a conclusion of the paper in section 5.
Reviews of Tsai et al.'s Scheme
In the section, we review Tsai et.al's multiauthenticated encryption scheme with one way hash function. The scheme consists of the four phases: system parameters setup phase, signature generation and encryption phase, message recovery phase and signature conversion phase. Please the interested reader refer to [10] for detail.
System Parameters Setup. Let p,q be two large primes which satisfy q|p-1. g is a generator of order q over GF(p). Each user U i chooses a x i ∈Z q as his private key and computes the corresponding public key yi=g xi mod p. h(.) is a public one way hash function. Before executing signature generation-encryption phase, we need to determine a clerk U k in advance, who is randomly chosen among all the signer of the group.
Signature generation and Encryption Phase. Without loss of generality, assume that there are n signer in the signing group, they are denoted as SG = {U 1 ;U 2 ;… ;Un}. And supposed that the signers Ui∈ SG want to send U k a message M, where 1≤M≤p-1. To produce a signature-encryption on message M, each user Ui∈ SG executes as follows:
(1) User Ui first choose an integer wi∈ Z q to compute r i =g wi mod p and broadcasts it to the other user U j ∈SG\{U i }. (2) After receiving all r j from the other user U j ∈SG\{U i }, user U i computes 
Where y v is the public key of the recipient U v . Then, the resultant ciphertext on message m is (C 1 , C 2 ,S, K).
Message Recoveryr Phase. Upon receiving the ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 , K, S), the U v can recover the message by the following three steps.
(1) First the recipient compute (
Security Analysis
Though Tsai et al.'s scheme was claimed to be secure, in this section, we show that Tsai et al.'s convertible multi-authentication encryption scheme [10] is insecure against rogue-key attacks. That is to say, an adversary who is a signing group member can easily forge a authenticated ciphertext on arbitrary message m. Without loss of generality. We assume that U 1 is an attacker and it wants to forge a authenticated ciphertext, To do so, it follows the following steps. To show that our forged ciphertext (C1;C2; S;K) on message m is valid, we only prove that the forged ciphertext satisfies the verification equation. In the following, we also show that conversion phase can also be forged. The detail is as follows:
(1) Let m be a forged message in the conversion phase. The reason to produce the above attack is that the adversary freely chooses his public key y 1 as a function of public keys of the other honest users, allowing him to produce forgeries easily. However, the private key x 1 of the user U 1 is unknown for his own. To overcome this attack, we must make that Ui's public keys of the user is certified or provide his secret key proof. A traditional way is that zeroknowledge proof of the public key y i of every user U i to the base g must be provided. However, it will increase the computation of protocol and the length of the signature. And the above attack way is suitable to Wu et al.'s convertible multi-authenticated encryption scheme.
Our Improved Scheme
In this section, to overcome our attack, we will propose an improved multi-authenticated encryption scheme without using zero-knowledge proof technique. The improved convertible multiauthenticated encryption scheme is divided into three phases: the signature-encryption phase, the message-recovery and the signature-conversion phase.
System Parameters. Let p,q be two large primes which satisfy q|p-1. g and h are a generator of order q over GF(p). Each user U i chooses a x i ∈Z q as his private key and computes the corresponding yi=g xi mod p as public key . And we include two cryptographic hash function H and H 1 which satisfy H: Z p →Z q and H 1 : Z p ×Z p →Z q .
Signature and Encryption Phase. Assume that there are n signer in the signing group, they are denoted as SG = {U 1 ;U 2 ;… ;Un}. To produce a signature-encryption on message m (with redundancy embedded), each user Ui∈ SG executes as follows:
(1) Every user Ui first choose an integer wi∈ Z q to compute r i =g wi mod p , then compute 
(1) First the recipient compute . At the same time, we also know our improved scheme is as efficient as Tsai et.al's scheme. Since only seversal hash function checks are involved in the signature and encryption phase.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze Tsai et.al's multiauthenticated encryption scheme, and show that Tsai et.al's scheme is insecure and cannot resist rogue key attack. Then we give the corresponding attack and analyze the reason to produce such attacks. To overcome the flaws of Tsai et.al scheme, an improved convertible multiauthenticated encryption scheme is proposed. The security of the scheme is based on the difficulty of one-way function and the discrete logarithm problem. And our scheme is efficient with Tsai et.al' multiauthentication encryption scheme. It is an open problem to construct a
